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INTRODUCTION
In “The Logic of Failure” (Dorner 1996), the author stated “It is hard to say whether
more damage has been done by evil people acting intentionally or good people acting in
ignorance.” This statement is particularly appropriate when addressing the collapse of the U.S.
economy that was precipitated by the crisis in the sub-prime mortgage market. Specifically, a
popular explanation for the crisis revolves around greed and a lack of ethical decision making
amongst some members of the financial community. While such an explanation may have some
merit, actions taken by people acting in good faith also played a role, as did the failure of others
to act, either because they could not or did not.
This paper illustrates how the lack of a systemic perspective among some of the key
actors in the crisis may have contributed to their failure to anticipate the unintended
consequences of well-intended actions. Moreover, it highlights the fact that the same
circumstances that created the current crisis have occurred multiple times throughout history, and
provided cues that signaled the likelihood of an oncoming disaster (Malkiel, 2007, Kindleberger,
1996, Mackay, 1974). This paper applies a methodology that can help decision-makers
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visualize how actions and events are interrelated, and thereby better understand both the long and
short term consequences of their decisions. The approach taken is not intended to be ‘the
answer’, but offers a starting point for developing a more systemic approach to recognizing and
addressing the booms and resulting busts caused by speculative investing.
The statement “The theory and practice that embodies ‘learning organizations’ can be
applied to developing and implementing effective natural policy and management” (Saveland,
1998) can be equally applied to securities policy and management. A learning organization is a
group of people who are continually enhancing their capacity to create the results they want.
(Senge 1990a, Senge 1990b, Zulauf 2007). At the heart of learning organizations is an
understanding of the underlying dynamics of a system. The representation that we develop
applies the language of systems thinking to the most recent financial crisis. A mental model of
this system and the corresponding systems structure can be used to not only understand what
happened, but inform decision-makers when similar speculative behavior occurs in the future.
This can in turn help them to understand the potential implications of different courses of action.
It goes without saying that the financial system being explored is complex and that a large
number of variables will influence its behavior. However, if even basic relationships between
key variables are not understood, the potential for poor outcomes will exist.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we review the origins of the
financial crisis and highlight the need for a systemic approach to examining it. We then describe
the concept of systems thinking, discuss its importance in understanding complex issues, and
highlight a key systems thinking tool, the causal loop diagram (CLD). Third, we show how
CLDs can be used to visualize behavior in complex systems. Finally, we use the CLD to show
how the underlying structure of speculative growth and collapse is consistent both over time and
across a wide variety of situations (i.e. from tulip bulbs to subprime mortgages).
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GOOD INTENTIONS GONE BAD
A challenge faced by organizations when existing markets are saturated and growth
opportunities are limited is how to sustain growth. Two common approaches to achieving this
are to add products to the portfolio offered to existing customers, or to expand the base of
customers served. While both approaches can be used effectively, they are not without pitfalls.
An excellent, but unfortunate example of the dangers of using these approaches without
understanding their underlying dynamics played out in the mortgage banking industry and is a
primary factor in the collapse of the U.S. economy. As we will discuss, similar phenomena have
played out multiple times throughout history. One dimension of the dynamic behavior we are
referring to is loss of focus. Pressure to expand the market base and/or product portfolio can
cause a firm to lose focus. This occurs if the firm drifts toward serving customer segments that
are not part of their strategic plans, or if they expand their product portfolio in ways inconsistent
with strategic objectives or process capabilities. While in the short term the adverse effects of
such moves might not be apparent and may be viewed as being consistent with broader strategic
objectives, over time, the cumulative effect of such moves can be devastating (Kaboub,
Todorova, and Fernandez, 2010).
Given limited opportunities to expand into overseas markets due to the regulatory
environment in those markets as well as the lack of infrastructure, banks and other financial
institutions sought to increase profits by developing new customers in existing markets. These
were customers that the institutions would not ordinarily have sought due to their profile;
low/relatively insecure income levels, few assets against which to secure financial obligations,
and consequently, high risk of default. Demyanyk and Von Hemert (2011) showed that
significant appreciation in housing prices also masked the risks of loaning money to high risk
3

customers. This led lending institutions to rationalize that increases in real estate equity would
enable high risk borrowers to either adjust their borrowing needs or sell short. From the lenders’
perspective, the new customer base represented a new source of income, but with little
significant risk. As Lewis (2010) demonstrates, most participants were wrong in their assessment
of this risk.
A casual reading of the evolution and scope of the subsequent economic crisis in the
popular press will cause even the most financially literate reader to recognize the complexity of
the problem. Such complexity calls for the need to view the crisis from a systemic perspective
rather than a traditional analytical perspective. Richmond (2003) observed that one reason we
make so little progress in addressing recurrent problems is that we continue to apply analytical
problem solving skills to systemic problems. However, through the application of systemic
thinking tools, we can evolve our thinking to better address large complex issues. These tools
make it possible to combine the many singular explanations for the crisis to develop a model that
can serve as a starting point for managers and policy makers to assess whether their mental
models of the crisis are complete AND correct. The crisis is the result of many factors coming
together, yet to understand the dynamics involved, we need to visualize how the variables fit
together. Moreover, once we have a sound understanding of the underlying dynamics, we can
seek leverage points that allow us to understand the consequences of changes to the model.

WHY SYSTEMS THINKING IS NECESSARY
Taken in isolation, none of the events that led to the sub-prime crisis and subsequent
economic meltdown were new. Various financial markets have experienced boom/bust cycles
dating back to the 1600's and the tulip bulb crisis involving speculation in the tulip bulb market
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in the Netherlands (Sterman 2000; Malkiel 2007). So why were there such severe consequences
on a global scale this time? To answer that question, it is important to understand that in the
early stages of the evolution of a complex system, the system is composed of several subsystems
that have little interaction or impact on each other. As a result, these subsystems can (and
generally do) behave as if they are independent, changing in ways that do not substantively
impact other subsystems. However, as the subsystems grow and evolve they become more
interdependent, eventually reaching a point where changes in one subsystem have a ripple effect
on others (Gharajedaghi 2006).
In the late 19th century and early part of the 20th century, financial institutions were
purely local entities. Consequently, an economic cycle (for example a real estate boom & bust
cycle) had essentially only local impact. As institutions started to expand and merge, an
economic failure in one part of the country could be felt in other parts of the country and indeed
internationally. This global interdependence was dramatically demonstrated within the financial
markets as a result of World War I and the collapse of the world economy in the 1930s (Ahamed
2009). Today, the interdependence of financial systems has reached a point where there exists a
“global economy so tightly linked that problems in the U.S. real estate market can help bring
down Icelandic banks and Asian Manufacturers” (Saporito 2009). The question is therefore not
how did the credit crisis happen, but rather how do we learn from it so that we recognize that the
Savings & Loan fiasco in the U.S. of the 1980s, the dot com boom/bust of the 1990s (Malkiel
2007), and the real estate/financial market collapse of the late 2000’s were all driven by the same
phenomenon. Indeed, the same underlying dynamic structure is behind every speculative
boom/bust cycle going back the tulip bulb bubble of the 1600’s. We must learn how to deal with
a large, highly interdependent global economy, and how to understand large complex systems
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with multiple interdependencies. Such insights may be obtained through the lens of systems
thinking
WHAT IS SYSTEMIC THINKING
Ackoff (1981) differentiated between analytical thinking and synthetic (holistic) thinking.
Analytical thinking attempts to understand a system by breaking it into small parts and studying
them in isolation. Once the parts are understood, the analyst attempts to explain the behavior of
the whole based on the behavior of the parts. This approach to decision making is the basis of
how decisions are typically made as it allows the decision maker to simplify the complex. In
contrast, synthetic thinking attempts to understand the larger context within which the system
operates. Once the role of a system within this context is understood, the synthetic thinker tries
to explain the behavior of the system based on that role. In other words, while analytical
thinking explains what the parts do and how they work, synthetic thinking explains why the parts
do what they do. Ackoff further pointed out that when a system is disassembled, it loses
essential properties as do its parts. He argued that observation of the interaction between and
among the parts is crucial to understanding system behavior. Consequently, it is impossible to
fully understand a system through analysis, thereby making the case for developing
synthetic/holistic thinking skills.
Forrester (1971) identified additional characteristics of complex systems which make it
difficult for people to understand and work with them. These include:
•
•
•

Cause and effect are often separated in both time and space.
Problem resolutions that improve a situation in the short term often create larger
problems in the long term. Conversely, actions that make things worse in the short
term often have positive long-term effects.
As a result of the first two characteristics, people often fail to learn from mistakes
because
▪ Long time delays often result in one person creating a cause and another
experiencing its effect.
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▪

•

Due to differences in short and long term effects, what a person learns from
the short-term result of a decision may be different from the long-term
outcome.
Subsystems and parts of a system interact using multiple, nonlinear feedback loops.
The complex flow of interactions often creates counterintuitive behavior, and
consequently, what appears to be the ‘right’ decision is in fact often a bad one.

It is not uncommon for decision makers to overlook the phenomena described above
when making decisions, and indeed many do not realize they exist. The concept of cause and
(instant) effect is generally learned at an early age through simple situations such as ‘if I touch a
hot stove I get burned.’ Subsequent and frequent conditioning results in our developing an eventoriented view of the world (Sterman 2000). We perceive the world as a series of cause and effect
relationships in which an effect has a single cause that occurred shortly prior to the effect
surfacing. This prompts us to treat problems as isolated events and to solve them using a
discrete, linear process; problem recognition, identification of alternative solutions, selection and
implementation of a solution that leads to problem resolution. While this may work with simple
systems, it oversimplifies the challenges associated with complex social systems. Parts of a
social system all have objectives and are constantly interacting. Because of the interdependency
of the parts, changes cannot be made in isolation. Moreover feedback loops can create
unintended consequences that do not follow a simple linear course and commonly include time
delays. Senge (2006) articulated the common misperception of event-oriented thinking in
saying that “Today’s problems come from yesterday’s solutions.”
Richmond (2000) defined two types of thinking related to the phenomena described by
Forrester. Dynamic Thinking describes a decision maker’s ability to see a phenomenon as the
result of behavior over time rather than a reaction to an isolated event. Closed-Loop Thinking
refers to the decision maker examining the role that the structure of the system (i.e. performance
measures, reward systems, and information flows) plays in creating behavior. It also examines
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interactions of the system with external forces. Once the structure and interactions are
recognized, closed loop thinking seeks to provide an understanding of how these interactions
feedback to shape the ultimate result of an intervention. Building on the work of Sterman,
Forrester, and Richmond, Atwater et al., (2008) characterized systemic thinking as reflecting
synthetic, dynamic, and closed loop thinking. Because of the bias towards an event-oriented
view of the world, individuals do not readily apply systemic thinking to decision making.
However, it is precisely the failure to think systemically, and in particular to consider time delays
(sometimes very long time delays), that prevents decision makers from seeing the implications of
individual actions. A tool that allows people to visualize complex interactions between both
tangible variables (currency, mortgage contracts, credit default swaps, etc.) and intangible
variables (attitudes and beliefs) would go a long way to helping us better see when certain
conditions arise that can lead to future melt downs. We believe that one tool that can serve that
purpose is the Causal Loop Diagram (CLD). In the next section we describe the tool and use it
to build a simple structure showing how speculative investment has created similar boom/busts
throughout history.

SYSTEMIC THINKING TOOLS
How does one develop systemic thinking skills? No one really teaches another person
how to think. However, people can be taught various principles and tools that help the mind
focus in a specific way (Zulauf, 2007). In business, several tools have also been developed to
help people better understand how parts of a system interact. Value Stream Mapping helps
managers trace workflows and see how parts of a process interact and which parts add value.
The Balanced Score Card to helps accounting managers assess the performance of a business
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across multiple dimensions simultaneously. Policy Deployment was developed to help
understand how various initiatives can be deployed horizontally and vertically across an
organization.
While the tools above enable connections between parts of a system to be explored, they
focus on discrete events, activities, or metrics. In short, they don’t help us truly see the bigger
picture so we don’t develop more complete mental models of reality. Senge (2006) pointed out
that because of our event oriented view of the world we often feel we are victims of
circumstances that happen to us rather than co-creators of those events. Because we feel that
events are the results of external forces that converge on us we fail to learn how we can influence
our environment. Dorner (1996) showed how people with event oriented mental models became
frustrated when dealing with the interrelated nature of problems occurring in complex systems
and in turn typically resorted to suboptimal behavior.
The focus of systemic thinking is on understanding the dynamic behavior of systems over
time. The field of systems dynamics has developed tools to help people understand the feedback
loops that create seemingly counterintuitive outcomes that make people with event oriented
mental models feel like victims of their environments. Sterman (2000a) demonstrated that people
cannot mentally simulate even the simplest possible feedback system, and argued that it is our
lack of representations of complex systems that leads to poor decisions.
Basic Causal Loops
A causal loop diagram (CLD) enables individuals to communicate mental models to
others in a way that can be easily understood. As people learn how to develop CLDs, they
improve their ability to organize and articulate their own understanding about the behavior of
systems. As individuals share and discuss their diagrams with others, they are able to acquire
multiple perspectives and refine their understanding of the system’s behavior.
9

The basic building blocks of a CLD are the links between variables. Variables are linked
using arrows, each arrow representing a link between two variables. In each two variable link,
the variable at the back of the arrow is said to cause a change in the behavior of the variable the
arrow points to. A plus or minus signs represents link polarity. Positive polarity signifies that the
two variables change in the same direction, and negative polarity means that the two variables
change in opposite directions. Figure 1 shows three causal links between variables that are part
of any discussion about the pricing of a commodity. For example, every asset (e.g., real estate)
has a true value. However, the market valuation may not reflect the asset’s true value. If the
perceived value of an asset is different from its true value, this creates a value gap. The arrow
with a plus sign indicates that if the perceived value increases, the value gap (i.e. the difference
between its true value and the perceived value) also increases. If perceived value decreases, then
the value gap also decreases. The arrow from the variable True Value to Value Gap has a
minus sign indicating that as the true value increases the value gap decreases and vice-versa.
True Value

-

Value Gap
+

Perceived Value of
Real Estate

Figure 1: Causal Links
CLDs are created when two or more variables are linked to form a closed loop. Figure 1
may be completed by adding the variable Demand for Housing in Figure 2. To interpret the
loop start with the variable Value Gap. As Value gap increases, demand decreases because
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buyers don’t feel they are getting a good return on their investment. As demand decreases the
perceived value of the real estate goes down. This is basic supply and demand economics. The
drop in perceived value works to bring the Value Gap back down as well 1
True Value
Demand
-

Value Gap
+
Demand
+
Perceived Value of
Real Estate

Figure 2: Balancing Loop
CLDs can represent either balancing or reinforcing loops. Figure 2 represents what is
called a balancing or goal seeking loop. This is signified by the teeter totter in the loop’s center.
The concept of a balancing loop is introduced here because this loop ‘seeks’ true value in the
housing market. A reader can use any variable as a starting point when interpreting loops.
Balancing loops result in the value of a variable moving in the reverse direction when a cycle is
completed. For example, when demand increases, perceived value increases, the value gap
increases, and thus demand decreases.
Figure 3 is an example of a reinforcing loop that represents another dynamic of
commodity pricing. This loop also has four variables but all the arrows have + signs indicating
that a change in a variable causes the next variable to change in the same direction, thus
reinforcing an ever increasing or decreasing outcome. Operating in isolation, this loop illustrates
exponential change in the values of all its variables. For example, when demand goes up, the

1

Readers interested in a more complete description of building a CLD may consult Anderson and Johnson (1997),
Maani and Cavana (2000), and Sterman (2000).
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perceived value of housing increases which drives up the price of the commodity. As the price
increases, expectations for capital gains also increase which stimulates further growth in demand.
The snowball running downhill is used to signify reinforcing behavior. The loop is referred to as
Speculative Demand because it shows how speculation drives prices. A phenomenon that has
happened many times throughout history!

Expected Capital
Gain

+
Demand

+

Speculative Demand

Price
+

Perceived Value of
Real Estate

Figure 3: Reinforcing Loop
As experience has taught us, growth has its limits. This occurs when balancing and
reinforcing loops are combined in the same system as shown in Figure 4. This is a classic
example of a recognized system archetype in the systems dynamics literature, known as the
“limits to growth.”

Expected Capital
Gain
+
Speculative Demand

+

True Value
Value Gap
-

Demand

+
Demand

+
Price

+

Perceived Value of
Real Estate
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Figure 4: Limits to Growth
System archetypes are generic structures that represent specific combinations of
feedback loops that occur in a wide variety of complex systems (Senge, 2006). Awareness of
archetypes makes it possible to recognize them at work within a particular system, and to use
them to both explain counterintuitive outcomes and identify leverage points for improving
system performance. They are powerful, both for diagnosing problems and for identifying highleverage interventions that will create fundamental change (Kim, 1992).
In Figure 4 the reinforcing, Speculative Demand loop drives prices up until investors
began asking the question what is the true value of this asset? At this point, concern that the
value gap is too large creates a ‘tipping point’ which causes the balancing loop Demand to
dominate. When this occurs, the belief that real estate is overvalued causes demand for real
estate to decline, and the virtuous cycle of increasing perceived value changes to a vicious cycle
of decreasing value. While these diagrams are oversimplified to introduce the CLD tool, they
capture the essence of the underlying phenomenon behind all speculative bubbles. Our particular
financial story is one of repeated speculative bubbles as described by Malkiel (2007) and
Kindleberger (1996). Knowing the story, the next step is to diagram its underlying structure.
Causal-loop diagrams offer a method to do this.
CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAMS AND SPECULATIVE BUBBLES
Adam Smith introduced the term the "invisible hand" to reflect how the market defines its
own balance in the pricing of assets or commodities. While the invisible hand has become the
mantra of proponents of a free market, Smith himself issued a note of caution, saying "this at
least would be the case where there was perfect liberty." Perfect liberty may be argued to be
synonymous with perfect markets (i.e. no cost to trade within markets, perfect and instantaneous
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information concerning demand, supply, costs etc., homogeneous investor expectations about
future events, returns, etc. and the ability to transfer land, labor, and material freely from one
investment/investor to another).
An assumption underlying perfect markets is that of instantaneous adjustment. As
discussed previously, cause and effect are often separated in both time and space. In the real
estate market a delay typically occurs between an increase in demand and the supply of new
properties. This delay causes existing real estate to become more valuable, at least in the short
term. Delays such as these are represented in CLDs as illustrated in Figure 5.
Percieved Value of Real Estate

+
New Construction

Expected Value
Supp ly

+
Delay

Expected Profits
Production Costs

Figure 5: Supply (Balancing Loop)
As expected profits increase, there is an incentive for developers to capitalize by
increasing the supply of new housing. However, it takes 2 to 3 years for new properties to come
on line. This is depicted in the CLD by the delay box between profits and construction. During
the delay, expected profits continue to increase spurring more and more construction. Once the
new construction comes on line, the increased supply leads to a decrease in the perceived value
of housing, which in turn leads sellers to decrease their price demands. Once prices start to fall,
expected profits decrease. This motivates developers to cut back on new construction, but again,
delays cause problems. Projects already under construction continue, and as they come online,
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this further contributes to oversupply, fueling a downward price spiral. Thus, expanded
construction has caused supply to overshoot demand causing rapid price declines.
Combining the Supply and Demand loops (Figures 2 and 5) results in the CLD model of
Smith's invisible hand (Figure 6). The upper Demand loop in Figure 6 illustrates how the value
gap regulates perceived value. In the perfect market as hypothesized by Smith, (i.e. delays may
be ignored), when demand increases the price of housing increases, this causes the value gap
between value of housing and its perceived value by investors to also increase, and as the value
gap increases, concern about overvaluation causes demand to go down.
The lower Supply loop illustrates how the supply side of the invisible hand also regulates
perceived value. When demand exceeds supply the perceived value of real estate goes up. In
response developers seek to cash in on the increasing expected value and profits by engaging in
new construction. This results in an increase in supply. As the supply catches up with demand it
drives down the perceived value.
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True Value
Delay

Demand

-

Value Gap
+
Demand

Perceived Value of
Real Estate

+

New
Construction

Expected Value
Supp ly

+
Delay

Expected Profits
Production Costs

Figure 6: Invisible Hand
However, delays are a reality in both loops. Delays in the supply loop are particularly
problematic and may cause the value gap between perceived value and true value to to
continually be out of alignment over a long term. The result is that rather than long term price
stability, the market may observe persistent oscillations in price.
John Stuart Mill (1848) provided an early description of speculative bubbles. His
observations have current relevance when one substitutes the terms real estate, sub-prime
lending, Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), etc. into his description. According to Mills, a
speculative reinforcing loop is created:
When there is a general impression that the price of some commodity is likely to rise,
from an extra demand, a short crop, obstructions to importation, or any other cause, there
is a disposition among dealers to increase their stocks, in order to profit by the expected
rise. This disposition tends in itself to produce the effect which it looks forward to, a rise
of price: and if the rise is considerable and progressive, other speculators are attracted,
who, so long as the price has not begun to fall, are willing to believe that it will continue
rising. These, by further purchases, produce a further advance: and thus a rise of price for
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which there were originally some rational grounds, is often heightened by merely
speculative purchases …"
Adding the speculative demand component (Figure 3) to Figure 6, results in a model which
provides a reasonable description of Mills’ speculative bubble (Figure 7). It is important at this
point to recognize the impact of a variable that is increasing in value but at a decreasing rate
(e.g., a price goes from 100 to 150 to 190 to 220 to 240 to 250 etc.). Thus, a slowdown in price
increases, not just a price drop, can be the tipping point that causes speculative demand to fall
and ultimately reverse the virtuous cycle and turn it into a vicious cycle (Lewis, 2010).
Note that Mills indicates that expectations of gains are based on price trends comparing
recent prices to historical prices. Because of delays in making the expanding supply available
(i.e. new construction can take months to be ready for occupation), the balancing Supply loop is
slow in adjusting prices to their true value.

+

Expected Capital
Gain

Speculative Demand
True Value
Price
+

Delay
+
Demand

Value Gap
-

+
Demand

+
Perceived Value of
Real Estate

+
Expected Value

New
Construction

Supp ly

+
Delay
+ Expected Profits
Production Costs

Figure 7: Speculative Bubbles
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Mills continues:
After a time this begins to be perceived; the price ceases to rise, and the holders, thinking
it time to realize their gains, are anxious to sell. Then the price begins to decline: the
holders rush into market to avoid a still greater loss, and, few being willing to buy in a
falling market, the price falls much more suddenly than it rose.
Figure 8 includes one final loop, Speculative Supply. Speculative developers, wishing to
capitalize on expected profits while prices are increasing, also add to new construction, which in
turn decreases the perceived value of housing and causes price to decrease. However, due to the
delay in adding to the supply, it often comes on line at the time of the collapse in demand,
leading to an oversupply that depresses prices long after the initial collapse.

+

Expected Capital
Gain

Speculative Demand
True Value

Delay
+
Demand

Value Gap

Price

-

+

+
Demand

+
Perceived Value of
Real Estate
Speculative Sup pply
+
+ Expected Value
Supp ly

New
Construction
+
Delay

+ Expected Profits
Production Costs

Figure 8: Speculative Bubbles
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The models leading to description of speculative bubbles, shown in Figure 8, do not
represent new research. Indeed, the creation of these CLDs and Mills insights on speculative
bubbles are part of an exercise in Sterman (2000). It is used here to demonstrate ‘forgotten’
knowledge.
We argue that the behavior related to the CLD for a speculative bubble is so common
throughout history that it should be seen as a systems archetype - an extension of the limits to
growth archetype – that describes the foundation of all speculative bubbles over the last 400
years. Key to these models is the concept of delay between cause and effect (Forrester, 1971).
With respect to the US real estate market, delays allowed several years of unbroken increases in
real estate values to create the illusion that the cyclical real estate market was no longer cyclical.
CLDS AND THE FINANCING OF SPECULATIVE BUBBLES
Figure 9 is a CLD representing one of the initiators of the real estate speculative bubble
that ultimately led to the collapse of the U.S. and world markets. The U.S. government sought to
stimulate economic activity and employment at the time of the dot com collapse. Real estate
constitutes a large fraction of the total wealth in any economy and generates a significant fraction
of banking activity. Home ownership also drives consumption of a variety of products and
services, and thus has a significant influence on the job market. Consequently, the government
put pressure on quasi-government entities (QGEs) such as Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac to
expand their portfolios of sub-prime mortgages to increase access to funding for home owners.
In response, the QGEs reduced their standards for purchasing portfolios of mortgages. As a
result, credit standards throughout the mortgage industry declined.
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Risk Transfer +
Instruments
+
Cap ital Availability

+
Demand

Percieved Default
Risk
-

Credit Standards

Pressure to Grow

+
Perceived Financial
M arket Health

-

Gov't Pressure to Expand
Home Ownership
+

+

Desire for Economic
Activity /Employ ment

Figure 9: Pressure to Grow
Financial institutions competed to be part of the expanded sub-prime market and expand
their access to mortgage instruments and their derivatives. Innovative financial instruments such
as credit default swaps were borrowed from other financial markets and applied to the real estate
sector. These instruments diversified the risks of individual mortgage obligations creating the
illusion of financial protection without the burden of traditional regulation. This motivated the
industry to provide more capital to the real estate market.
The increase in capital created a corresponding increase in demand. This combined with
the already high demand from traditional customers and speculators outlined in Figure 4 caused
the perceived risk of default on real estate financial securities to decrease. The decreased
perception of defaults caused investors to believe real estate markets were safe, a conclusion
which was further supported by government pressure to increase real estate activity and the lack
of scrutiny of that market.
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Figure 10 combines the Limits to Growth archetype of Figure 4 with the Pressure to
Grow CLD of Figure 9. The resulting CLD is a simplified system illustrating only the financing
of the demand cycle of a speculative boom. Indeed, it may have been the financing CLD that
triggered the speculative demand (Brueckner, Calem, and Nakamura, 2012). The Pressure to
Grow loop illustrates why financial institutions, faced with limited growth opportunities,
perceived the new financial instruments as a safe way to generate new growth. Investors flocked
to purchase these instruments, fuelling a significant increase in leverage. However, the capital
that entered the financial markets was inextricably linked to speculation in the real estate market.
This was not seen as a problem since many years of prosperity had created the illusion that real
estate never lost value and that the resulting financial instruments were always safe.

Expected Capital
Gain

Risk Transfer +
Instruments
+

+

Cap ital Availability

Percieved Default
Risk
-

Speculative Demand
Delay
True Value
Value Gap
-

+
Demand

+

Credit Standards

Pressure to Grow

-

Demand
Price

+

+
Perceived Value of Perceived Financial
Real Estate
M arket Health

Gov't Pressure to Expand
Home Ownership
+

+

Desire for Economic
Activity /Employ ment

Figure 10: Financing the Boom
As seen in the Limits to Growth archetype, reinforcing loops such as the Pressure to
Grow cannot run indefinitely. After a period of delay, the lower credit standards resulted in
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cascading defaults. Figure 11 adds a new loop called Reality Kicks In. This loop shows how the
virtuous cycle in the Pressure to Grow loop turned into a vicious cycle. The reduction in credit
standards eventually led to a number of actual loan defaults. This in turn resulted in claims on
insurance instruments (e.g. the credit default swaps) that exceeded what anyone had the
capability to pay. The resulting defaults led to a decrease in capital availability that reversed the
cycle from virtuous growth to a vicious downward cycle.
Collateral Claims
+

+
Risk Instrument
Default

Reality Kick In
Expected Capital
Gain

Actual Defaults
-

Risk Transfer
+
Instruments

+

+

+
Cap ital Availability

Perceived Default
Delay
Risk

Speculative Demand
Delay

-

True Value
Value Gap
-

+
Demand

+

Credit Standards

Pressure to Grow

-

Demand
Price

+

+
Perceived Value of Perceived Financial
Real Estate
M arket Health

Gov't Pressure to Expand
Home Ownership
+

+

Desire for Economic
Activity /Employ ment

Figure 11: Financial Collapse
Defaults on a small percentage of loans in a small percent of counties in the U.S. had an
adverse impact on the health of those financial institutions that had borrowed large sums of
money to participate in the speculation. The loan defaults caused the holders of subprime
mortgage portfolios to make claims on the new financial insurance instruments. Since these
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instruments did not have the funds necessary to pay the clams issuers of these instruments were
forced into default. This compromised the integrity of those financial instruments that relied on
steady income streams from loan payments, bringing into question the financial health of a broad
range of financial institutions. The failure of large institutions caused a reversal in the ability of
those working in that area of the financial markets to attract and retain capital, bringing the
speculation to an end. With the collapse of the market’s ability to provide capital, the broader
financial markets began to melt down. Financial institutions now held large portfolios of nonperforming loans. Losses, magnified by the effects of leverage, drove real estate valuations
below what was owed. Positive reinforcing loops that drove the market and the economy became
negative reinforcing loops. The resulting vicious cycles affected more than just real estate.
Ultimately they caused the collapse of ALL credit markets and the larger economy.
CONCLUSION
We have used the subprime mortgage market to illustrate the use of systems dynamics
tools to improve our ability to think systemically. It was chosen because it is both an excellent
example of a complex system in action, and because recent behavior within the market illustrates
a dangerous yet recurrent problem, the consequences of which are more significant each time the
problem occurs. The subprime mortgage market is the latest episode in history where
speculative investment has played out to disastrous results. Each time this behavior has surfaced
it has generated larger scale ramifications. We feel this is due to the removal of the slack in the
system (i.e. the world is growing smaller and economies are becoming ever more intertwined).
The use of the CLD tool however allows us to draw several important insights.
The basic systems archetype known as Limits to Growth provides the first insight. This
archetype suggests that positive reinforcing loops cannot run indefinitely, as counter-balancing
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events, which are ALWAYS present within a system, eventually constrain growth. The event
may be an investor asking the question what is an asset really worth, or a Federal Reserve
Governor such as Edward Gramlich raising concern over sub-prime lending practices. Growth
may also slow down because of mortgage defaults as illustrated. Failure to recognize the Limits
to Growth within the U.S. real estate market played a major role in its collapse. We argue that
the speculative bubble shown in Figure 8 should be considered a fundamental archetype since
institutions, companies, governments, and individuals have not learned the lessons, except with
20-20 hindsight, of the last 400 years. Indeed, at the time this article is being written, we are
witness to a speculative bubble in energy pricing that some are predicting is the wave of the
future. Learning organizations embody both theory and practice to allow policy makers to learn
to recognize the dynamics of this type of behavior and develop mechanisms that address the
development of speculative bubbles.
The second insight is that delays play multiple roles within a system. Delays can make a
bad situation worse. Delays inherent in the construction industry resulted in new properties being
completed at precisely the time when housing prices started to decline. Delays frequently result
in people not learning lessons from past events. The perception that real estate values would
never go down encouraged many individuals and financial institutions, to link their financial
positions to the real estate market. In reality, real estate boom and bust cycles are well
documented. Ten years of increasing real estate values are not unusual and certainly no
indication that values never fall. Following the Savings and Loan Collapse, Hernandez (1990)
interviewed several participants in the market. As one developer noted, “Will the banks or the
developers learn? Well, a number of lenders are now saying that they will never again lend on
real estate. I have an answer for that. All it takes is just one generation of bankers and developers
to churn through that hasn't been through the cycles.” Here again we feel the Speculative Bubble
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archetype needs to be more widely developed and used to teach future decision makers so they
better understand how the interconnections of complex systems create counterintuitive outcomes.
The third insight is the realization that reinforcing loops can cause both growth and
decline. The same variable that created the positive reinforcing loops that drove the market and
the economy also caused the negative reinforcing loops or vicious cycles that collapsed the real
estate market, and, in the end, brought down the larger U.S. and global economy. The market
collapse of 2008-2009 is certainly unprecedented in its scope, but despite claims to the contrary,
financiers should have seen it coming. Prior boom/bust cycles have had less impact, but the
impact of successive cycles seems to grow. In a globally inter-connected economy, the
implication is that if people do not learn how to see the big picture, society will face similar
situations again and quite possibly with more disastrous repercussions.
A final point to consider is that while the models presented in this paper necessarily oversimply the events of the last several years, they accurately describe phenomena underlying the
collapse of the real estate and financial markets. Moreover, the figures contained in this paper
rely heavily on the work of Sterman (2000) in his modeling of the collapse of the Savings and
Loan industry in the 1980’s. What is particularly revealing is that while his causal loop diagrams
offered a way to understand the dynamics of that speculative bubble and to draw parallels with
the growth of the real estate market prior to 2007, it did not prevent a repeat.
This paper demonstrates that despite the surface level uniqueness and complexity of the
recent economic collapse, there is an underlying thread that links the recent collapse with
speculative boom/busts going back over 400 years. Malkiel (2007) and Sterman (2000)
demonstrate that that history repeats itself particularly with respect to speculative bubbles. It is
likely that there are other complex events that have played out repeatedly in history that also
have an inherent structure that can be better understood through the use of tools like CLDs.
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Saveland (1998) notes “Reflective conversion offers a mechanism to change ourselves and our
culture … Systems thinking, with its causal-loop diagrams and simulation models, provides a
language to facilitate this conversation.” This is a key point of this paper – to provide a
framework that can be part of the conversation. CLD’s allow one to make tangible something
that is otherwise not. It is important to note that many other balancing and reinforcing loops
could be added to the model presented. These might deal with, for example, inflation, default
risk, regulation, the liquidity crunch, and incentives that motivate loan officers to lie and cheat.
However, in the interests of trying to limit our portrayal to the essential foundations of the crisis,
we did not include them. Future work could certainly include expanding the CLD.
Several other opportunities exist to extend the current work. For example, an important
question is why some institutions that did not get drawn into the speculative bubble. Insights
gained from their behavior provide an opportunity to add richness to the model. In addition to
extending the model, creating a simulation of the model would help us to better understand the
dynamics of how various loops interact. For example, we cannot know if the variables in a CLD
will create a virtuous or vicious cycle, but a simulation model can help us better understand the
circumstances that lead to one type of cycle or another. Moreover, a simulation may provide a
means to understand how specific actions influence the behavior of the system.
Moving leaning organizations forward is an exercise in personal mastery, mental models,
shared learning/vision and community building (Senge et al. (1994). Moreover, the reality that
decision-makers face inherent challenges as well as factors beyond their control when
responding to complex situations is not new. Causal Loop Diagrams are not a solution to
addressing these challenges. We do however believe that such diagrams are necessary, even
essential, but not sufficient. They can help us to build mental models and facilitate the
development of personal mastery and shared learning in a way that complements the decision26

making process. It is our hope that this paper will serve to stimulate people to apply systemic
thinking to future speculative bubbles, and also develop archetypes that can be used to address
other complex problems that have repeated throughout history.
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